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ABSTRACT
Standard theoretical arguments tell us that countries with relatively little capital benefit from
financial integration as foreign capital flows in and speeds up the process of convergence. We show
in a calibrated neoclassical model that conventionally measured welfare gains from this type of
convergence appear relatively limited for the typical emerging country. The welfare gain from
switching from financial autarky to perfect capital mobility is roughly equivalent to a one percent
permanent increase in domestic consumption for the typical emerging economy. This is negligible
relative to the potential welfare gain of a take-off in domestic productivity of the magnitude
observed in some of these countries.
Pierre Olivier Gourinchas Olivier Jeanne






Ask an economist, and the bene￿t of international ￿nancial integration that ￿rst comes to his
or her mind is likely to involve, in one way or another, the eﬃciency of laissez-faire. A more
open and competitive international capital market induces a more eﬃcient international
allocation of capital. A development-minded economist, in particular, will point to the
impact of capital ￿ows from developed (capital-abundant) to less developed (capital-scarce)
countries on economic growth and convergence. Indeed, one of the main motivation behind
the push towards the international ￿nancial integration of less developed countries has been
to accelerate their growth by attracting foreign capital.1
We understand these bene￿ts well enough in theory, but how large are they in practice?
This paper presents a new piece of evidence, based of the calibration of a simple neoclassical
growth model. We choose the neoclassical framework for two reasons. First, it is one where
international ￿nancial integration is desirable for well-known reasons. Second, this model
has increasingly been adopted as the benchmark framework in the literature on growth and
convergence in an international perspective. As a result, we can rely on this literature to
calibrate the model, and compare the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent policies, including capital
account opening.
We present two versions of the neo-classical model. The ￿rst ￿and simplest￿ one is a
variant of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopman model where countries accumulate physical capital
only. It serves to motivate and provide some intuition for our results. The second one
proposes a higher level of detail and realism by introducing human capital accumulation in
a ￿Macro-Mincer￿ framework. Our main ￿nding is that while ￿nancial openness increases
domestic welfare, and while this bene￿tc a nb es i g n i ￿cant for some countries, it is not
very large on average. For the typical non-OECD country, the welfare gain from switching
from ￿nancial autarky to perfect capital mobility is equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of about one percent. This bene￿t is of the same order of magnitude as the
cost of economic ￿uctuations (in less developed countries), and of an order of magnitude
smaller than the gains that development economists and policymakers seek to achieve. For
example, we ￿nd that eliminating 25 percent of the productivity gap with the United States￿
a productivity increase smaller than the magnitude experienced in post-war Singapore, Hong-
Kong or Israel￿yields a welfare bene￿t that is more than one hundred times larger!
Interestingly, we ￿nd that the gains from international ￿nancial integration may be rel-
atively small even for countries that receive a lot of capital in￿ows. In the simple Ramsey
model, for example, the typical non-OECD country has a gain of only 1 percent in spite of
the fact that in￿ows more than double its stock of capital. This apparent disconnect comes
1See Eichengreen and Mussa (1998) (p.12): ￿The classic case for international capital mobility is well-
known but worth restating. Flows from capital-abundant to capital-scarce countries raise welfare in the
sending and receiving countries alike on the assumption that the marginal product of capital is higher in the
latter than in the former. Free capital movements thus permit a more eﬃcient global allocation of savings
and direct resources toward their most productive uses.￿, or Fischer (1998) (p. 2): ￿Put abstractly, free
capital movements facilitate an eﬃcient global allocation of savings and help channel ressources to their
most productive uses, thus increasing economic growth and welfare￿.
2from the essentially transitory nature of the distortion induced by imperfect capital mobil-
ity. A capital-scarce country that restricts the entry of foreign capital bears a distortion
that is proportional to the wedge between the domestic and foreign returns on investment.
Even if the capital account restriction remains in place forever, the distortion endogenously
vanishes over time as the country accumulates capital domestically. The average distortion,
as a result, is much lower than the initial distortion￿and the initial capital in￿ows￿might
suggest.
We also ￿nd that international ￿nancial integration does not lead to a signi￿cant degree
of convergence between developed and less developed countries. The reason for that result
is straightforward. In the neoclassical model, the gap in GDP per capita between developed
and less developed countries can be decomposed into a transitory component due to capital
scarcity and a permanent component due to diﬀerences in productivity and domestic distor-
tions. For international ￿nancial integration to have a substantial impact on convergence,
the ￿rst component would have to be relatively important. The data, however, suggest that
the opposite is true: less developed countries have a lower income per capita mainly because
they are less productive or their economy suﬀers from domestic distortions, not because they
are capital-scarce.
We believe that our ￿ndings have important implications for the research agenda on
￿nancial globalization. The recent crises have certainly dampened the hope that capital
account liberalization provides a smooth road to growth and development, and the time
seems ripe for re-examining the bene￿ts and costs of international ￿nancial integration. This
paper suggests that if the bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration are large, they must
occur through channels that are not in the standard neoclassical framework. Moreover, these
channels can explain large gains (in our metric) only if international ￿nancial integration
raises the productivity of less developed countries.2 A challenge for future research is to
identify the possible channels and test their empirical relevance.3
Our ￿ndings also have implications for the recent debate on reforming the ￿interna-
tional ￿nancial architecture￿. A commonly held view is that capital ￿ows to less developed
economies are excessively low, and that the international ￿nancial architecture should be
designed so as to increase the access of less developed countries to the international ￿nancial
market. This paper suggests that even if capital ￿o w sw e r eb e l o wt h ee ﬃcient level, the
potential gains from mitigating this ineﬃciency might be quite moderate. Countries have
much more to gain from upgrading their domestic engines of growth and development than
from attracting foreign capital.4
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the bene￿ts of capital account liberal-
ization for less developed countries. A number of papers have attempted to answer the same
2The literature on trade liberalization has reached a similar conclusion. In calibrated neoclassical models
the gains from trade liberalization typically amount to less than 1 percent of GDP (de Melo and Tarr (1992)).
This has led some authors in the trade literature to conclude that if free trade yields large welfare gains, it
must be because of its impact on productivity (Rutherford and Tarr (2002)).
3Possible channels are discussed in the concluding comments.
4Of course, a country that increases its productivity also makes itself more attractive to foreign investors.
Our claim is that the country bene￿ts much more from the productivity increase itself than from the resulting
capital in￿ows.
3question as we do, but on the basis of cross-country regressions.5 The results are pretty
heterogenous, ranging from no impact of capital account opening on growth (Rodrik (1998))
t oam o r eo rl e s ss i g n i ￿cant positive impact (see Edison, Levine, Ricci and Sloek (2002), for
a review). At the optimistic end of the spectrum Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2002) and
Henry (2003) ￿nd that opening the stock market to foreign investors boosts growth by 1 to
2p e r c e n tf o r￿ve years in a row. Such a result, however, is not obvious to translate in terms
of domestic welfare. How permanent is the impact of capital account opening on growth? Is
the level of output aﬀected in the long-run? What share of the output increase is transferred
to foreign investors? These questions are crucial in assessing the welfare impact of capital
account opening, and can be addressed only by looking at the data through the lenses of an
explicit model.
Another branch of literature looks at the bene￿t of international ￿nancial integration
in terms of portfolio diversi￿cation. A number of papers present quantitative estimates
based on calibrated models, comparable to ours since they are expressed in the same metric.
The reported results vary enormously, with most papers ￿nding gains from international
risk-sharing smaller than 0.5 percent (e.g., Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)) and some
studies reporting larger welfare gains (see e.g. Obstfeld (1994)).6
Whatever the reasons behind these diﬀerences, there is widespread consensus on the fact
that the world is remote from the extent of risk-sharing that takes place in these models￿a
gap between the theory and reality that is multifaceted and has been abundantly documented
in the literature on the ￿puzzles￿ of international ￿nance (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000)). If
anything, this gap seems even wider for the emerging market countries than for developed
ones￿the ￿sudden stops￿ in capital ￿ows documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) seem
especially diﬃcult to interpret in terms of optimal risksharing.7 For all these reasons, we
view capital accumulation and growth as potentially better candidates than international
risk-sharing to understand the bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration for developing
economies.
Our results are consistent with the recent developments of the literature on growth and
convergence in international perspective. In contrast with early papers that stressed factor
accumulation as a source of growth (Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); Barro, Mankiw and
Sala-i-Martin (1995)), the literature has moved towards the view that total factor productiv-
ity rather than factor accumulation accounts for most of income diﬀerences across countries
(Hall and Jones (1999); Easterly and Levine (2001)).
This literature has not looked at the impact of international ￿nancial integration on
growth and convergence. We present a ￿development accounting exercise￿ that highlights the
5Some papers present estimates of the bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration based on calibrated
models, as we do here, but focus on developed economies. For example, Mendoza and Tesar (1998) estimate
the impact of integration in models where the taxation of capital is endogenous. Table 2 in Mendoza and
Tesar (1998) suggest that the welfare bene￿t of integration is small￿less than 0.5 percent of permanent
consumption in the United States.
6See Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) for a discussion of the literature and an attempt to account
for these diﬀerences.
7Somewhat paradoxically, the theoretical welfare gains from international risksharing are estimated to
be larger when the model is calibrated with reference to less developed economies because they are more
volatile (see Pallage and Robe (2003)).
4relative contributions of factor accumulation, productivity and a conditional convergence
gap that ￿nancial integration eliminates. We show that while countries may be far from
their steady state, conditional convergence plays a minor role compared to the other two
factors in explaining the development gap between poor and rich countries. One implication
is that international ￿nancial integration can equalize the marginal return of capital across
countries without closing the large gaps in productivity and income per capita between poor
and rich nations. It is this implication of the ￿neoclassical revival￿ in growth economics that
we quantify in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents results based on a very stylized
neoclassical model. Section 3 presents an extension of the model with endogenous human
capital accumulation and various distortions, and interprets our results in the context of a
decomposition of world inequality in output per capita. Section 4 concludes with a discussion
o ft h ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h i sp a p e rf o rf u t u r er e s e a r c h .
2 A Simple Experiment
Consider a small Ramsey-Cass-Koopman (RKC) economy that can accumulate physical
capital using the savings of its residents and/or by attracting capital from abroad. The
country is small relative to the rest of the world in the well-de￿ned sense that the capital
account regime has no impact on the world return on capital. Our ￿experiment￿ assesses the
bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration for this economy by comparing two extreme
cases: a state of complete ￿nancial autarky in which the country has to rely purely on
domestic savings, and a state of perfect ￿nancial integration in which the country can import
or export capital at the (given) world interest rate.
We assume that there are no impediments to ￿nancial ￿ows under ￿nancial integration.
This maximizes the welfare bene￿ts from integration, since capital movements will fully
and immediately arbitrage away any diﬀerence in marginal returns to capital. In other
words, ￿nancial integration can potentially result in immediate and massive capital ￿ows
from a capital-abundant rest of the world to a capital-scarce domestic economy. While the
associated dynamics are trivial, this represents, we believe, a simple and transparent case
where the gains from international ￿nancial integration are potentially large.
Because of its theoretical simplicity, this experiment provides a useful benchmark to start
with. The next section will incorporate the insights of the recent literature on convergence
and growth in an international perspective, to obtain a more realistic measure of the bene￿ts
of international ￿nancial integration for a large sample of emerging economies. As we will
see, our results are surprisingly robusts to these extensions.
2.1 The Model
We consider a world with one homogeneous good and a number of countries. In this world,
we focus on a subset of small less-developed countries that may or not open their capital
account. Time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. The population grows at an exogenous
5rate n: Nt = ntN0 that is country speci￿c. The population of each country can be viewed





s Nt+s u(ct+s), (1)
where ct is consumption per capita and u(c) ≡ c1−γ/(1 − γ) is a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility function with coeﬃcient γ>0. In the case where
γ =1 , the utility function is u(c)=l n( c).






where Kt denotes the stock of domestic capital, Lt is labor supply and At is a labor-
augmenting measure of productivity. Labor supply is exogenous and proportional to pop-
ulation (Lt = Nt). Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Labor productivity grows at
a gross rate gt ≡ At/At−1,w h i c hm a yd i ﬀer across countries in the short-run but converges




This is a common assumption in the empirical growth literature (Mankiw et al. (1992)).9 The
common asymptotic growth rate g∗ re￿ects the advancement of knowledge, which should not
be country speci￿c in the long run. If growth rates of productivity diﬀered permanently across
countries, the world income distribution would diverge without bounds and the country or
region with the highest long-run growth rate would overtake world output. Some mechanism,
such as innovation and technology transfers, must constrain the tendency toward in￿nite
divergence (Eaton and Kortum (1999); Parente and Prescott (2000)).
However, countries could diﬀer in their growth rate of productivity in the short run, or
in their levels of productivity A in the long-run. Diﬀerences in productivity growth underlie
recent ￿growth miracles￿. Diﬀerences in productivity levels re￿ect, as Mankiw et al. (1992)
mention, ￿not just technology but resource endowments, climate, institutions, and so on￿
(p.411). Hall and Jones (1999) ascribe these diﬀerences in productivity levels to diﬀerences
in institutions and government policies, which they call ￿social infrastructure￿.
Under ￿nancial autarky each country accumulates capital domestically. The neoclassi-
cal framework predicts that the economy will converge towards a balanced growth in which
capital, output and consumption per capita asymptotically grow at the same rate as pro-
ductivity. We denote with tildes the variables normalized by the level of productivity, i.e.
￿ xt = xt/At. It follows from the Euler equation for consumption, u0(ct)=βRt+1u0(ct+1) that
￿ ct =( βRt+1)
−1/γ gt+1￿ ct+1, (3)
8We assume further that βng∗(1−γ) < 1 so that the utility is well de￿ned.
9The literature often adopts the stronger assumption that the growth rate of productivity is the same for
all countries and at all times, i.e. gt = g∗.




R∗,t h enatural level of the gross rate of interest, is the same for all countries.
Taking the limit of the ￿rst-order condition for capital Rt = α￿ k
α−1
t +1−δk (where δk is
the depreciation rate of capital) gives the asymptotic level of productivity-adjusted capital
lim
t→+∞




R∗ + δk − 1
¶1/1−α
, (5)
which is also the same for all countries.
Under ￿nancial integration domestic agents can lend or borrow at the gross world
interest rate. We assume that the rest of the world is composed of developed countries that
have already achieved their steady state. Under that assumption, the world interest rate
is equal to the natural gross rate of interest, R∗,a n d￿nancial integration does not ￿tilt￿
permanently consumption pro￿les.10 This assumption has one important implication. The
long-run levels of capital and output per capita are the same under autarky and ￿nancial
integration. These levels may diﬀer across countries because of persistent diﬀerences in
productivity levels, but they are not aﬀected by the capital account regime. The eﬀect of
integration is to accelerate the country￿s convergence towards a steady growth path that is
determined by other factors.
Under ￿nancial integration the path of the economy is as follows. First, the Euler equation
ct =( βR∗)
−1/γ ct+1 implies that domestic consumption per capita grows at rate g∗ as soon
as the country is ￿nancially integrated. Second, the ￿rst-order equation for capital implies
that ￿ kt jumps immediately to its long-run level ￿ k∗. Let us assume that domestic residents
can choose the international allocation of domestic wealth k0 at time 0. The consumption














where wt =( 1− α)At￿ k∗α is the real wage received by the representative family member at
time t. It follows that c0 is given by
c0 =( R
∗ − ng












We measure the gains from international ￿nancial integration as follows. Let us denote by
Uaut and Uint the domestic welfare at time 0 under ￿nancial autarky and ￿nancial integration
respectively. The welfare under autarky has no closed-form expression in general, and must
be computed by solving numerically for the saddle-point stable equilibrium. By contrast,
10We believe that it would not be very appealing to assume that the bene￿ts of international ￿nancial
integration come from intrinsic and permanent diﬀerences in the natural rate of interest between countries.
7since under ￿nancial integration consumption per capita is increasing at the constant rate









where c0 comes from the intertemporal budget constraint (6).
By the ￿rst welfare theorem we know that domestic welfare is higher under ￿nancial
integration than under autarky. In the following discussions, we report the Hicksian equiva-
lent variation µ, de￿ned as the percentage increase in the country￿s consumption that brings








if γ 6=1 ,a n dµ = exp((1 − nβ)(Uint − Uaut)/N0) − 1 if γ =1 .
2.2 Calibration and Results
We estimate the welfare gains of ￿nancial integration for 82 non-OECD countries with annual
data in 1995.11 Some parameters are common to all countries while others are country-
speci￿c. The common parameters are given in Table 1. We set g∗ =1 .012 in line with
long run multifactor productivity growth in the U.S. While the assumption that the capital
share is constant across countries is certainly too strong, recent estimates by Gollin (1998)
suggest that the Cobb-Douglas assumption is roughly appropriate, with an estimated capital
share between 0.2 and 0.4. Accordingly we set α =0 .3.W ea l s oa s s u m eac o m m o nr a t eo f
depreciation of physical capital, equal to 6% per annum. With these assumptions, the world
real interest rate is equal to R∗ =1 .0542 and the ￿common￿ steady state capital-output
ratio k∗/y∗ is equal to 2.63.
Each country is characterized by a constant population growth rate n,a ni n i t i a ll e v e lo f
capital per capita k0, and a productivity path (At)t≥0. We measure n as the average rate of
growth of the working age population between 1985 and 1995, where working age is de￿ned
as 15 to 64 years old. Data on total population and on the fraction of the population of age
15-64 is obtained from the 2002 World Bank Development Indicators.
We construct measures of the initial capital stock using data from the Heston, Summers
and Aten (2002) Penn World Tables, Mark 6.1 (PWT) using investment rates and a perpetual
11The selection is based on OECD membership at the beginning of the time period, so our sample includes
three current OECD members, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey. The 82 countries are Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote D￿ivoire,C y p r u s ,D o m i n i c a nR e p u b l i c ,E c u a d o r ,E g y p t ,E l
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8βγ αδ k g∗
0.96 1 0.3 0.06 1.012
Table 1: Common parameters
inventory method like in Bernanke and G￿rkaynak (2001).12 The productivity level of a given
c o u n t r yi nag i v e ny e a r0 c a nt h e nb ed e r i v e df r o mi t sc a p i t a ls t o c k ,i t so u t p u ta n dt h eC o b b -
Douglas relationship y0 = A
1−α
0 kα
0. One can then compute for each country the ratio of the
capital installed in year 0 to the capital level that would prevail under perfect ￿nancial
integration, k0/(A0e k∗). This capital ratio is a measure of the country￿s capital abundance.
It is higher than 1 for the countries that export capital under integration, and lower than 1
for the countries that import capital.
T a b l e2g i v e sp o p u l a t i o nw e i g h t e da v e r a g e so ft h ec a p i t a lr a t i o sf o rv a r i o u ss u b s e t so fo u r
sample of countries de￿ned on a regional or income level basis.13 For comparison, we also
report the capital ratio for 22 OECD countries (last row).14 There is no signi￿cant capital
gap for OECD countries, a result consistent with our assumption that emerging countries
can borrow and lend internationally at rate R∗ from industrialized countries.
Non-OECD countries exhibit a signi￿cant capital de￿cit, with capital ratios averaging
0.41, and increasing steadily with income level. While that average masks substantial het-
erogeneity ￿with capital ratios as low as 0.03 for Uganda, and as high as 1.37 for Singapore,
most developing countries are still far away from their steady state. A decomposition by
regions reveals that Africa and Asia are furthest away from steady state, compared to Latin
America. Finally, since China and India together represent 52.8% of the population in our
sample, the table also reports separately the results for Non-OECD countries outside these
two countries.
In order to compute countries￿ welfare gains from integration in year 0 we need the path
of future productivities (At)t≥0. We start with the simple assumption that productivity
grows at the long-run rate g∗ from year 0 onwards (i.e., that there is no productivity catchup
relative to the U.S. after year 0).
Table 3 shows the bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration for the same country
groupings as in table 2. While the gains for individual countries can be substantial (with a
maximum of 8.03 percent for Mozambique), the average gain per capita are much smaller, of
the order of 1.24 percent of autarky consumption. These gains are decreasing with income,
as expected, since richer countries are also closer to steady state. The results are similar
whether China and India are included in the sample or not.
It is important to emphasize that we ￿nd small welfare gains despite, as table 2 makes
12Hsieh and Klenow (2003) and Cohen and Soto (2002) argue that one should construct capital stocks using
nominal investment rates instead of PPP investment rate, since poorer countries face systematically higher
relative prices for investment goods. Since nominal investment rates are higher, this yields comparatively
smaller capital gaps, and hence smaller welfare gains. Using nominal investment rates, we estimate an
average capital ratio of 0.75. (The results are available upon request to the authors.)
13We use the World Bank income classi￿cation. See http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm
14The 22 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA.
9Capital ratio
k0/k∗ Obs.
Non-OECD countries 0.41 82
Low Income 0.29 38
Lower Middle Income 0.46 25
Upper Middle Income 0.68 14




except China and India 0.46 80
China and India 0.36 2
OECD 1.01 22
Table 2: Capital scarcity. Population weighted average. Year is 1995.
Equivalent Variation, µ (percent)
mean min max s.d. Obs.
Non-OECD countries 1.24 0 8.03 0.87 82
Low Income 1.71 0.01 8.03 0.92 38
Lower Middle Income 0.98 0 2.99 0.54 25
Upper Middle Income 0.23 0.09 2.10 0.28 14
High Income (non OECD) 0.05 0.01 0.32 0.09 5
Africa 1.65 0.01 8.03 1.60 44
Asia 1.27 0 1.81 0.51 16
Latin-America 0.40 0.09 1.95 0.51 22
except China and India 1.06 0.00 8.03 1.19 80
China and India 1.39 1.08 1.79 0.50 2
Table 3: The bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration.
The table reports the population weighted average of the equivalent variation µ. Year is 1995.
clear, substantial initial capital gaps. Figure 1 reports the equivalent variation as a function
of the initial capital ratio k0/k∗ for all non-OECD countries in our sample. The solid line
represents the theoretical welfare gains for a country with the same population growth rate
as the United States, as a function of its initial capital ratio.15 This graph delivers a stark
message: since the curve is very ￿at around 1, a country must be very scarce or very abundant
in capital to signi￿cantly bene￿t from international ￿nancial integration. The capital ratio
must fall below 0.36 or exceeds 2 for the gains from integration to exceed 2 percent. The
same is true for the developing countries in the sample: only countries very far from steady
state ￿typically below 0.2￿ enjoy signi￿cant gains from ￿nancial integration. Such countries
represent less than 4 percent of the aggregate population in our sample.16
15Countries are below the curve because they generally have a higher population growth rate than the
United States.
16The 11 countries, all African, with gains in excess of 2 percent are: Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
102.3 Is it large? Some Comparisons.
It is important to establish relevant points of comparisons. After all, a welfare gain of 1.24%
of consumption would be considered quite high in the empirical public ￿nance literature
establishing the incidence of taxes (Mendoza and Tesar (1998)). Another point of comparison
comes from the literature on the bene￿ts of smoothing economic ￿uctuations. Although our
estimates are substantially larger than the bene￿ts for developed economies, estimated to
represent a fraction of a percentage point (Lucas (1987)), they are of the same order of
magnitude as the bene￿ts obtained by Pallage and Robe (2003) for less developed economies
and aid-dependent countries.
This section proposes two other points of comparison. First, we present estimates of the
welfare gains from a productivity catch-up. Then, we evaluate the bene￿ts of international
￿nancial integration on output growth and convergence.
2.3.1 The bene￿t of a productivity take-oﬀ
We now revisit the assumption that relative productivity remains constant. Clearly, this is
a ne x t r e m ea n du n r e a l i s t i ca s s u m p t i o n .F i g u r e2r e p o r t st h ec h a n g ei nr e l a t i v ep r o d u c t i v i t y
A0/Aus
0 for non-OECD countries between 1960 and 1995. While many developing countries
fell behind in terms of relative productivity, a number of countries ￿such as Hong-Kong,
Singapore, Cyprus, Israel or Mauritius￿experienced a drastic improvement in productivity.
These countries increased their productivity relative to the United States by more than 25
percent over that time period, and by as much as 78 percent for Hong Kong. We now
evaluate the welfare gains from such productivity catch-up.
More speci￿cally, assume that productivity converges partly toward the world technology


















in the ￿rst thirty-￿ve years (t ≤ 35), after which the growth rate in productivity goes back
to the U.S. level. The variable x represents the convergence in productivity expressed as a
fraction of the original productivity gap. The case x =0corresponds to no-convergence, and
x =1corresponds to full convergence in 35 years.
Table 4 reports relative productivity in 1995, as well as the welfare gains from a pro-
ductivity catch-up ranging between 25 and 100 percent under ￿nancial autarky. Emerging
countries are much less productive than the U.S., with an average relative productivity of
0.14, increasing with income. In that context, we ￿nd that the gains from a productivity
catch-up are extremely large. A 25 percent reduction in the productivity gap yields welfare
gains of 135 percent on average. A full catch-up would yield the equivalent of an almost six
fold increase in consumption!
11Equivalent Variation, µ (percent) productivity catch-up
x (percent)
A0/Aus
0 25 50 75 100 Obs.
Non-OECD countries 0.14 135 258 377 494 82
Low Income 0.10 190 365 534 701 38
Lower Middle Income 0.14 99 188 273 356 25
Upper Middle Income 0.29 46 88 130 171 14
H i g h I n c o m e ( n o n O E C D ) 0 . 4 8 1 93 75 57 2 5
Africa 0.12 260 504 742 979 44
Asia 0.26 116 222 323 421 16
Latin-America 0.12 55 106 156 205 22
except China and India 0.18 150 291 428 563 80
China and India 0.11 120 229 332 433 2
Table 4: The bene￿ts of a productivity catch-up.
The table reports the population weighted average of the equivalent variation µ for various values of the
productivity catch-up. Year is 1995.
2.3.2 A diﬀerent metric: output growth and convergence
As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical literature on the bene￿ts of capital account
liberalization often focuses on domestic output growth. We can use our simple model to
revisit this issue. Table 5 reports the increase in output growth predicted by the model
at various horizons. The large increase in output growth at a one-year horizon re￿ects the
absence of any friction in the capital market. More realistically, the table shows that at the
5-year horizon the gain in output growth can be substantial, in excess of 2.5 percent per year
on average. The empirical literature reports somewhat smaller gains. For instance, Bekaert
et al. (2002) ￿nd a 1 percent higher growth rate of output after 5 years, following an equity
market liberalization. In light of our welfare calculations, these growth improvements do not
necessarily have major welfare implications.
The preceding table emphasizes that the impact on output growth can be substantial,
especially at short horizons. Yet, the overall impact on intertemporal output may be rel-
atively small. We illustrate this point in Figure 3. Panel A represents the impact of full
international ￿nancial integration on the present discounted value of output. The horizontal
axis represents the present discounted value of domestic output per capita under autarky
(in thousand of international 1995 dollars) while the vertical axis represents the present dis-
counted value of domestic output per capita under ￿nancial integration. For comparison,
the ￿gure also includes a 45 degree line. The vertical distance between each point and the
45 degree line measures the permanent output gains from ￿nancial integration. As we can
see from the ￿gure, for most countries, the output gains are hardly discernible at all. For
the sake of comparison, Panel B of ￿gure 3 shows the results under a domestic productiv-
ity catchup of 25, 50 or 75%, according to equation (9). By contrast with international
￿nancial integration, a productivity take-oﬀ has a ￿rst-order eﬀect in reducing international
diﬀerences in permanent income per capita.
12Change in domestic output growth (percent, per annum)
Horizon
15 1 0 O b s .
Non-OECD countries 30.03 2.83 0.65 82
Low Income 39.59 3.59 0.81 38
Lower Middle Income 24.75 2.46 0.58 25
Upper Middle Income 11.63 1.26 0.31 14
High Income -0.78 -0.10 -0.03 5
Africa 41.29 3.52 0.78 44
Asia 29.57 2.87 0.66 16
Latin-America 15.50 1.59 0.38 22
except China and India 28.88 2.64 0.58 80
China and India 31.07 3.02 0.70 2
Table 5: Impact on Growth.
The table reports the population weighted change in domestic output growth following ￿nancial integration.
Year is 1995
2.4 Intuition and Robustness
The welfare gains from a technological catch-up dominate those from international ￿nancial
integration by an order of magnitude. That the gains from a catch-up are large is not too
surprising once it is realized that a catch-up of 25 percent more than doubles the productivity
(and output per capita) of most non-OECD countries in the long-run. Rather, the surprise
is that the gains from international ￿nancial integration are so low, given the very large size
of capital in￿ows predicted by the model when the typical non-OECD country opens itself
to foreign capital. This section provides the intuition for why the gains from international
￿nancial integration are low.
To build up our intuition, we derive a simple expression for the welfare gain from a
marginal increase in international ￿nancial integration. Let us assume that in a capital-
scarce country, a central planner authorizes the entry of a marginal amount of foreign capital
dκt+1 at time t (using quantitative capital controls, say). This increases the equilibrium real
wage and decreases the return on domestic savings. By the envelope theorem, we know that
the net welfare gain from the marginal capital in￿ow is the same as if dκt+1 were invested at
time t and the resulting increase in domestic net income were consumed in period t+1.T h e
marginal increase in period t+1domestic net income is dyt+1 −R∗dκt+1, where the increase
in domestic output dyt+1 is equal to the marginal return to capital, Rt+1, times the capital




The welfare gain from a small capital in￿ow in terms of current consumption is equal to the
return diﬀerential between the country and the rest of the world times the capital in￿ow.
One can view ￿nancial integration at time 0 as the result of an incremental process in
which the social planner continuously relaxes the capital controls in all subsequent periods.
17Population growth is assumed away for simplicity.
13Assume that at time 0 all the subsequent authorized capital in￿ows are increased by a small









where ￿ R ≡ (1 − β)
P∞
0 β
tRt+1 represents the permanent value of the domestic interest rate.
Starting from the capital ratio of the average non-OECD country (0.41), the initial do-
mestic return on capital is 15 percent, 10 percent above the world interest rate. But the
domestic return converges toward the world interest rate, and the permanent value ￿ R, at
6.9 percent, is only 1.46 percent higher than the world interest rate. Equation (10) then
implies that starting from autarky, a marginal capital in￿ow equal to 1 percent of domestic
consumption yields a welfare bene￿t equivalent to 0.0146 percent of consumption. Thus, the
welfare gain for the recipient country is a very small fraction of the face value of the capital
in￿ows.
From that point of view, there is a signi￿cant diﬀerence between our results and those
of the calibrated literature on the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. The small welfare
gains in that literature￿sometimes referred to as the ￿Harberger constant￿￿arise from the
elimination of small ￿triangular￿ distortionary losses. Here, the large size of the capital in￿ows
unleashed by ￿nancial integration might suggest that the welfare triangle is not small; yet,
the welfare losses from the distortion are found to be as small as in the trade literature. The
reason has to do with the intertemporal pro￿le of the distortion. By contrast with trade
restrictions, the distortion induced by capital account restrictions tend to vanish by itself
over time, as countries converge toward the same steady-state level of capital under autarky
as under integration. The welfare cost of autarky is determined by the intertemporal level
of the distortion, which may be much smaller than the initial level.
The small gains from international ￿nancial integration are intuitive, conditional on the
return diﬀerential predicted by the model. This raises the question of whether this diﬀerential
is empirically plausible. The model predicts an average marginal return on capital of 15
percent for non-OECD countries in 1995. This seems consistent with some estimates of the
return to investment in less developed countries. For example, Isham and Kaufman (1999)
￿nd that the average economic rate of return on private projects ￿nanced by the World Bank
is 14 percent.19
Another issue is the speed at which the return diﬀerential decreases over time, which
is directly related to the conditional speed of convergence toward the steady state. As is
well-known, the convergence speed in the benchmark Ramsey model is excessively high. In
our model the speed of convergence￿measured as the fraction of the output gap that is
eliminated every year￿is 11.16 percent. This is much larger than the 2-3 percent reported
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and inside the 8-13 percent range estimated by Caselli,
18See appendix A.
19Banerjee and Du￿o (2002)￿s study of the Indian credit market reports much larger returns that are left
unexploited because of credit rationing. However, credit rationing will apply to foreign investors in the same
way as domestic lenders, unless one has a theory of how international ￿nancial integration reduces domestic
￿nancial frictions. This is indeed an important question￿as we argue at the end of the paper￿but one
outside the scope of the neoclassical framework.
14Equivalent Variation, µ (percent)
γ
1351 0 O b s .
Non-OECD countries 1.24 2.49 2.43 2.14 82
Low Income 1.71 3.99 4.15 2.18 38
Lower Middle Income 0.98 1.45 1.04 1.31 25
Upper Middle Income 0.23 0.11 0.25 4.22 14
High Income (non OECD) 0.05 0.65 2.57 12.51 5
Africa 1.65 5.01 6.31 5.75 44
Asia 1.27 2.17 1.75 1.00 16
Latin-America 0.40 0.58 0.67 3.74 22
except China and India 1.06 2.72 3.21 4.04 80
China and India 1.39 2.28 1.72 0.43 2
Table 6: Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution.
The table reports the population weighted average of the equivalent variation µ for various values of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/γ
Esquivel and Lefort (1996), who correct some biases in earlier estimation methods. Given
that the model￿s speed of convergence is close to the highest estimates obtained in the
literature, it would be reassuring to test the robustness of our results to modi￿cations of the
model that reduce the speed of convergence.20 We do this in the next section by introducing
human capital.21
Finally, we close this section with a robustness test. Our results so far are derived under
log preferences. One could argue that lower elasticities of intertemporal substitution would
increase the gains from ￿nancial integration by lowering welfare under autarky. However
a smaller elasticity of intertemporal substitution also makes households more reluctant to
accumulate capital. This increases the long run natural world interest rate R∗ = g∗γ/β,
lowers our estimates of the capital gap, and consequently, the potential gains from ￿nancial
integration.22 Table 6 presents results for values of γ between 3 and 10. We ￿nd that the
welfare gains increase on average, from 1.24 to 2.49 percent of consumption when γ =3 ,
then decrease as the second eﬀect dominates.
20To see by how much our results could be aﬀected by the speed of convergence, consider the extreme
case where this speed is zero (i.e. if the return diﬀerential remained at its initial level forever). Then the
permanent value of the return diﬀerential would jump from 1.46 percent to 10 percent, a seven-fold increase.
This is large in relative terms, but note that a seven-fold increase would still leave the gains from integration
much below those from a productivity catch-up.
21Of course, this is not the only way convergence could be slowed down in our model. For example,
we could introduce an external credit constraint as in Barro et al. (1995). This would reduce the speed
of convergence conditional on integration, and so thegains from integration. Alternatively, the convergence
speed could be reduced by introducing adjustment costs in capital accumulation. This would lower the speed
of convergence both under autarky and under integration, with an a priori ambiguous impact on the gains
from integration.
22This puts some discipline on which elasticity of intertemporal substitution one should choose. For
instance, with γ =1 0 , we estimate an unreasonable capital ratio k0/k∗ of 1.14 for non-OECD countries.
153 Extending the basic model
We now augment the model of section 2 in two ways. First, we introduce human capital
accumulation. Second, we allow for domestic distortions in the accumulation of physical and
human capital.
Human capital is a basic element in growth theory. Diﬀerences in educational attainment,
or schooling rates translate into more or less productive labor force and have long been
described as a key element in cross-country income diﬀerences. Microeconomic studies also
document signi￿cant returns to education (Du￿o (2001)). Second, human capital makes the
transition dynamics more realistic, both under ￿nancial integration￿where the dynamics
are no longer trivial￿and under autarky ￿where the accumulation of human capital slows
down the convergence toward the steady state. Finally, human capital accumulation is a
channel through which domestic productivity is endogenous to the capital account regime.
Faster accumulation of physical capital could induce faster accumulation of human capital,
in particular by increasing the real wage.
The motivation for introducing distortions in the accumulation of physical and human
capital is to give a better account of observed cross-country diﬀerences in investment rates.
The previous section assumed that diﬀerences between countries are summarized by their
initial level of productivity A0 and the growth rate of population n. This implies relatively
small cross country variations in capital accumulation rates. For instance, the model of the
previous section predicts steady-state physical investment rates between 20.8 and 29 percent
for non-OECD countries. This is at odds with the data, where average investment rates from
1985 to 1995 range from 2.80 percent (Madagascar) to 41.40 percent (Singapore). Similarly,
distortions in the accumulation of human capital allow us to account for observed educational
attainments ranging from 0.7 years (Mali) to 10.1 years (South Korea). Easterly, Kremer,
Pritchett and Summers (1993) report that accumulation rates for physical and human capital
are very persistent across decades.
3.1 The model
We assume that the labor employed in production Lt is homogenous and has been trained
with Et years of schooling, which we will interpret as educational attainment. As a result,













t re￿ects the exogenous, non-human-capital-related, determinants of productivity.
The function φ
0 (E) represents the marginal return to schooling estimated in a Mincerian
wage regression.
Human capital accumulation depends upon the fraction of time devoted to education, st,
according to
Et+1 =( 1− δe)Et + θst (11)
where δe is a depreciation rate for human capital and θ captures the eﬃciency of the domestic
schooling technology and accounts for steady state diﬀerences in educational attainment.
16This perpetual inventory speci￿cation is consistent with existing empirical work on human
capital stocks (see Barro and Lee (1993)). Because the problem is not concave in the level
of educational attainment, we must impose bounds on s to avoid corner solutions in which
the country invests 100 percent or 0 percent of its time in education. We impose that
0 ≤ s ≤ s ≤ ﬂ s<1. Finally, labor market clearing implies Lt =( 1− st)Nt.
Investment in domestic capital is implicitly distorted at rate τ,so that the private return
to domestic capital is (1 − τ)Rt. We refer to τ as the capital wedge. As discussed above, it
allows us to match the observed disparity in saving rates across countries. τ is a shorthand
for all the distortions that potentially aﬀect the return to domestic capital: credit mar-
ket imperfections, taxation, expropriation, bureaucracy, bribery and corruption... Diﬀerent
models would have diﬀerent implications for the implicit rents generated by the distortion,
zt ≡ τRtkt. For simplicity, we assume that they are rebated in a lump-sum fashion to the
representative agent. In this manner, we focus exclusively on the distortive aspects of the
capital wedge.
The model with human capital is solved in appendix A in the case where catchup is
limited to human capital (A0
t = A0
0g∗t). The main features of the equilibrium are preserved.
Physical and human capital converge to steady state values that are independent of the
capital account regime. Human capital converges to a level that depends on the eﬃciency of
the domestic schooling technology (and not on the capital wedge). The investment in human
capital is bang-bang under ￿nancial integration in the sense that s = s (s = s)i fh u m a n
capital is above (below) its long-run level. It follows that human capital converges to the
steady state level in ￿nite time.
To illustrate the eﬀect of human capital accumulation, Figure 4 reports the convergence
paths to the steady state for education, consumption, physical and human capital, for an
economy calibrated to the U.S. when k0 =0 .5k∗ and E0 =0 .6E∗.23 The convergence tra-
jectories are very diﬀerent depending upon the capital account regime. In this example,
the country has initially relatively more human than physical capital. Under autarky, it is
optimal to concentrate on accumulating physical capital. Hence the schooling rate s and
consumption c are low, while capital accumulates rapidly. Under ￿nancial integration, by
contrast, it is always optimal to accumulate human capital as rapidly as possible. This
implies a smaller rate of accumulation of physical capital until s reaches its steady state.
Second, convergence￿although not instantaneous￿is much more rapid under ￿nancial in-
tegration. The integrated economy reaches its steady state in about ￿fteen years.
Figure 4 illustrates that ￿nancial opening need not be associated with large capital in-
￿ows, at least initially. In this particular example, there are no capital in￿ows or out￿ows at
time 0. On the other hand, when human capital reaches its steady state, a large quantity of
labor becomes available for production and attracts correspondingly large amounts of capi-
tal. The ￿gure also illustrates that long run consumption under integration c0 is lower than
steady state consumption under autarky c∗.24
23 The parameters are set to the U.S. economy: τ =0 .66%; θ =1 .28; n =0 .73%; δe =2 .76%. These values
imply ￿ k∗ =9 .62,s ∗ =0 .29 and E∗ =1 3 .49. We also impose s =0and ﬂ s =0 .5.
24See appendix A for a closed-form expression for c∗ − c0 as well as some interpretation.
173.2 Calibration and results
The details of the calibration are presented in appendix B. We follow Hall and Jones (1999),
and adopt a piecewise linear representation of the returns to schooling consistent with the
empirical evidence in Psacharopoulos (1994). We construct estimates of the steady state
and initial human capital, by following closely the perpetual inventory method of Barro and
Lee (1993). Brie￿y, we construct a measure of total educational attainment for people over
age 25 using data on durations and educational attainment rates of primary, secondary and
higher schooling. This provides a stock measure Et, every ￿ve years from 1960 to 2000. We
assume further that s =0and ﬂ s =0 .5.25
The capital wedge τ and the schooling eﬃciency θ were calibrated for each country as
follows. We construct the conditional steady state of each country by projecting forward the
observed enrollment and investment rates. We then infer the values of τ and θ by ￿tting the
steady-state accumulation rates predicted by the model to the country￿s conditional steady
state. This assigns some of the diﬀerences in long-run output per capita to diﬀerences in
physical and human capital accumulation rates. As discussed above, we see as empirically
plausible that countries have diﬀerent long-run accumulation rates. Therefore, this case
constitutes our benchmark.
For the sake of the comparison, we also look at the results under the assumption that
there are no distortions, i.e. the capital wedge τ is equal to zero and the schooling eﬃciency
θ is the same as in the U.S. in all countries. This assumes that diﬀerences in long run output
per capital are solely explained by diﬀerences in productivity A0 a n dp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hn.
It corresponds more closely to the assumptions of the previous section with physical capital
only and allows us to check the plausibility of our results under￿admittedly extreme￿
assumptions.
Table 7 reports relative human capital, E0/E∗, as well as the projected steady-state
attainment level E∗ and the eﬃciency of the schooling system relative to the U.S. while
table 8 reports the relative physical capital k0/k∗ together with the estimated capital wedge
τ.26
In the presence of distortions, we ￿nd that countries are close to their steady state,
with an educational attainment ratio of 1.03 and a capital ratio of 0.68.27 The average
relative education parameter is 0.61, much below one, while the capital wedge is moderate
b u tp o s i t i v e ,e q u a lt o7 . 6 % . T h ec a p i t a lw e d g ei sn e g a t i v ef o rt h eh i g hi n c o m ec o u n t r i e s
because our method interprets the very large average saving rates of countries like Singapore
(41%) and Korea (37%) as evidence of an implicit subsidy to investment (-4.7%. and -4.%
25This assumption in￿uences the speed of convergence toward the steady state under ￿nancial integration.
The assumption that ﬂ s =0 .5 ensures that no country is constrained in steady state.
26The sample contains 60 countries. The following 22 countries do not have detailed educational data
and were dropped: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic Of
Congo, Cote D￿ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand and Zimbabwe.
27Such a high human capital ratio is partly driven by China and India, two very populous countries that
undertook signi￿cant education programs, and are estimated to be above steady state. Removing these
countries, the average human capital ratio drops to 0.68.




Steady State: benchmark benchmark benchmark no distortion
Non-OECD countries 0.61 5.08 1.03 0.35 60
Low Income 0.49 4.16 0.95 0.27 21
Lower Middle Income 0.66 5.11 1.17 0.40 21
Upper Middle Income 0.78 7.47 0.75 0.42 13
High Income (non-OECD) 1.01 11.20 0.88 0.72 5
Africa 0.76 6.44 0.64 0.29 25
Latin-America 0.75 7.08 0.76 0.40 22
Asia 0.57 4.56 1.13 0.36 13
except China and India 0.94 6.95 0.68 0.34 58
China and India 0.69 3.90 1.26 0.36 2
Table 7: Human Capital parameters and Estimates. Population weighted averages. Year is 1995.
respectively). Conversely, Mozambique and Uganda, countries with the lowest average saving
rates (2.9% and 3% respectively) are associated with a large capital wedge (40% and 46%
respectively).
It is noteworthy that in spite of the distortions, the capital ratio, at 0.68, remains low on
average. Our results do not indicate, as is sometimes presumed, that emerging economies
will not bene￿tf r o m￿nancial integration because they are very close to their steady state.28
Unsurprisingly, countries are found to be even further below their steady states if the latter
are not lowered by distortions￿with an average educational attainment ratio of 0.35 and
physical capital ratio of 0.27.
Human capital accumulation slows down convergence toward the steady state. Figure 5
presents convergence paths for output relative to steady state in the simple model of section
2 (black solid line) as well as the models of section 3 with and without domestic distortions
(dashed and blue solid line respectively). To construct this ￿gure, we set initial physical
and human capital so that the initial output ratio is 0.9.29 It is apparent that convergence
is much slower with human capital accumulation, with or without distortions. The speed
of convergence decreases from 11.16 percent in the model without human capital to 3.67
and 3.21 percent respectively in the model with and without domestic distortions. These
convergence speed are reasonably close to the lower range of existing empirical estimates
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)).
T a b l e9r e p o r t st h ew e l f a r eg a i n s .T h eb e n c h m a r kc a s ey i e l d sw e l f a r eg a i n st h a ta r ev e r y
similar to the simple experiment of the previous section. Non-OECD economies bene￿t, on
28However, it is interesting to note that Latin America and Africa are above their steady state. These
regions are capital-abundant conditional on their productivity and their distortions.
29The corresponding initial ratios are respectively: k0/k∗ =0 .70 for the model with physical capital only,
k0/k∗ = E0/E∗ =0 .90 for the model without distortions, and k0/k∗ = E0/E∗ =0 .82 for the model with
distortions.
19Wedge (%) Capital Ratio Obs.
τk 0/k∗
Steady State: benchmark benchmark no distortion
Non-OECD countries 7.6 0.68 0.27 60
Low Income 12.0 0.66 0.17 21
Lower Middle Income 4.8 0.63 0.30 21
Upper Middle Income 5.4 1.03 0.47 13
High Income (non-OECD) -3.2 0.54 0.83 5
Africa 19.3 1.20 0.23 25
Latin-America 7.4 1.06 0.43 22
Asia 6.2 0.55 0.25 13
except China and India 10.2 0.96 0.33 58
China and India 6.0 0.51 0.23 2
Table 8: Capital Ratio and Capital Wedge. Population weighted averages. Year is 1995.
average, to the tune of 0.95 percent of consumption from a complete ￿nancial liberalization.30
The gains from integration are more than ￿ve times larger if the distortions are removed (5.51
percent instead of 0.95 percent). This suggests that the two changes we have made to the
simple model of section 2 (the accumulation of human capital and the distortions) oﬀset
each other. On the one hand, the accumulation of human capital, in and of itself, increases
signi￿cantly the gains from integration by slowing down convergence and by inducing a
catch-up in productivity. On the other hand, the distortions tend to reduce these gains
by bringing countries closer to their steady states. It turns out that on balance, the two
eﬀects cancel out and the average gain remains about the same as in section 2. However, the
geographic distribution of the gains is diﬀerent￿low income countries now bene￿t less than
lower middle income countries from international ￿nancial integration, because they are less
eﬃcient in the accumulation of (physical and human) capital.
3.3 Prosperity and Capital Mobility: Development Accounting
What are the implications of our analysis for the world income distribution? Our ￿ndings
indicate that international ￿nancial integration, unlike a productivity catch-up, does not
signi￿cantly reduce the gap between developed and less developed countries. An equivalent
interpretation is that transitional convergence explains little of the world income distribution.
Consider a country like Togo. According to our calculations, Togo stands to gain 0.19% of
permanent consumption if it opens its capital account completely and foreign capital is free
to rush in. But perhaps this should not come as a surprise, once we realize that the gross
investment rate in Togo has been only 6.03% from 1985 to 1995, that the implicit distortion
on real returns to capital is 26.9% and the education eﬃciency of Togo relative to the U.S.
30The number for high income non-OECD countries is negative. This is so since the model with distortions
does not satisfy the criteria of the ￿rst welfare theorem. Countries can be made worse oﬀ by international
￿nancial integration. Speci￿cally, this happens when countries subsidize capital returns (τ<0). Capital
in￿ows mean that the subsidy goes to foreign investors.
20Equivalent Variation, µ (percent)
Steady State: benchmark no distortion
mean s.d. mean s.d. Obs.
Non-OECD countries 0.95 0.65 5.51 2.52 60
Low Income 0.96 0.51 7.29 2.41 21
Lower Middle Income 1.16 0.56 4.62 1.45 21
Upper Middle Income 0.35 0.27 2.80 1.27 13
High Income (non OECD) -1.38 0.96 0.62 0.28 5
Africa 0.83 1.13 6.14 5.22 25
Asia 1.07 0.56 5.78 1.81 13
Latin-America 0.32 0.30 3.24 1.55 22
except China and India 0.65 0.95 4.89 3.54 58
China and India 1.14 0.24 5.99 1.49 2
Table 9: The bene￿ts of international ￿nancial integration.
The table reports the population weighted average of the equivalent variation µ. Year is 1995.
stands at 0.6. In other words, ￿nancial integration would only bring Togo much faster to a
much impoverished steady state.
According to this interpretation, the diﬀerence between industrialized and emerging
economies is not that the latter start with a large capital de￿c i tt h a tc a nb e￿lled by capital
in￿ows but rather that they are converging toward a much lower level of income. Although
capital account opening can accelerate this convergence, the welfare bene￿t appears small
when compared to the long-run inequality resulting from long run cross-country diﬀerences.
This interpretation does not imply that countries are close to their steady state, simply that
the steady states themselves are quite far from the steady state of a country like the United
States.
Consider then, the gap between a country￿s income per capita in some reference year￿say
1995￿and the steady-state income per capita in the U.S.: y0/y
∗,us
0 .We can think of economic
development as a process that closes the ￿development gap￿ between standards of living in
emerging countries (y0) and their steady-state levels in the developed world (y∗us
0 ).
A key question for economic development consists in identifying the sources of this devel-
opment gap. Do they re￿ect the fact that emerging countries are far away from their steady
state? Do they re￿ect lack of domestic saving, possibly caused by a high capital wedge?
Do they re￿ect high distortions or low returns in the accumulation of human capital? Or
do they re￿ect low domestic productivity? To asnwer these questions, we decompose this















where ￿ y denotes output per eﬃcient unit excluding the contribution of human capital (y/A0).
The ￿rst term re￿ects the gap coming from the fact that the country has not yet converged
to its steady state. We refer to this term as the convergence gap. This gap is eliminated
more quickly under ￿nancial integration.
21The second term re￿ects the cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of (physical and
human) capital accumulation. We call it the distortion gap. It can be further decomposed
into a physical capital and human capital components. Countries with a large distortion gap
are poor because their domestic capital markets are distorted and/or because their human
capital accumulation technology is very ineﬃcient.31
The third term in equation (12) re￿ects diﬀerences in productivity between the domestic
country and the United States that are not accounted for by human capital. We denote it
the productivity gap. Countries with a large productivity gap are poor because they have a
lower productivity than the United States after controlling for human capital.
Our decomposition is related to Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones (1997). Hall and Jones
decompose relative output per worker into a relative capital, relative human capital and
relative productivity term. Implicitly, their method includes a relative convergence gap
term (the ratio of the convergence gap relative to the US convergence gap) that is allocated
between the capital-output component and human capital components. Jones decomposes
steady state relative output into its capital and productivity gap components. His focus on
steady state output excludes a convergence term.
Table 10 reports summary development accounting statistics for each component in equa-
tion (12), in 1995. The ￿rst column reports the development gap. It is large, with non-OECD
countries at only 11% of the U.S. steady state income per capita. The second, ￿fth and sixth
columns report respectively the convergence, distortion and productivity gaps. Columns
three and four further decompose the distortion gap into its physical and human capital
components. It is immediate that while the convergence gap is substantial (0.74), it ac-
counts for a small fraction of the development gap compared with the distortion (0.45) and
productivity (0.3) gaps. These numbers imply that even with full convergence￿so that
the convergence gap would be eliminated￿the development gap would still equal only 0.14
(0.45*0.3) of the U.S. steady state. Looking at the components of the distortion gap, it is
also apparent that diﬀerences in schooling eﬃciency (0.54) account for a larger share than
diﬀerences in investment rates (0.83).
To summarize, if capital mobility simply brings faster conditional convergence, it will not
succeed in closing the gap between poor and rich countries. Diﬀerences in standards of living
arise mostly from diﬀerences in productivity and human capital, especially for the poorest
countries.
Figure 6 presents additional evidence on the role of the convergence gap. In each panel,
the horizontal axis reports the log development gap ln(y0/y
∗,us
0 ) against the log of each
component in Table 10. As the ￿gure makes clear, the convergence gap is the only component
that is not positively correlated to the development gap.32 In other words, while poorer
countries are, on average, less productive, accumulate less human and physical capital, there
is no evidence that they are further away from their steady state.
31See Appendix A.
32An OLS regression yields a signi￿cant coeﬃcient of -0.08 and an ﬂ R2 of 0.21.




0 ￿ y0/￿ y∗ capital capital ￿ y∗/￿ y∗,us A0/Aus
0 Obs.
Non-OECD countries 0.11 0.74 0.83 0.54 0.45 0.30 60
Low Income 0.07 0.68 0.74 0.48 0.36 0.28 21
Lower Middle Income 0.10 0.76 0.89 0.55 0.49 0.27 21
Upper Middle Income 0.23 0.87 0.86 0.64 0.55 0.49 13
High Income 0.44 0.74 1.20 0.82 0.98 0.61 5
Africa 0.13 0.88 0.66 0.60 0.40 0.35 25
Asia 0.09 0.70 0.86 0.52 0.45 0.27 13
Latin-America 0.20 0.88 0.82 0.62 0.51 0.46 22
except China and India 0.16 0.83 0.79 0.60 0.49 0.38 58
China and India 0.07 0.68 0.86 0.50 0.43 0.26 2
Table 10: Development Accounting. Population weighted averages. 1995.
4 Implications for Future Research
Based on a calibrated neoclassical growth model, we ￿nd that less developed countries do
not bene￿t greatly from international ￿nancial integration. Less developed countries have
far more to gain from improving their own domestic allocative eﬃciency than from an im-
provement in the allocative eﬃciency of the international ￿nancial system. This does not
mean, however, that international ￿nancial integration is irrelevant for development. Indeed,
it could be quite important, but if it is, this is through channels that are not captured by
the basic neoclassical framework.
If most of the inequality in world income is explained by diﬀerences in productivity
or domestic distortions, then the question of how the capital account regime interacts with
domestic allocative eﬃciency seems quite relevant. Understanding the determinants of coun-
tries￿ productivity is a central question in development economics, which considers a very rich
array of explanations: technological innovation and diﬀusion, the legal regime and property
rights, policies and institutions, and their political economy underpinnings. The neoclassi-
cal approach makes the strong assumption that these determinants are not aﬀected at all
by the capital account regime. It would be interesting to explore the alternative: i.e. the
channels by which international ￿nancial integration could raise or lower the productivity
of less developed countries.33 In other terms, one might have to open the Pandora￿s box of
development economics in order to really understand the bene￿ts and costs of international
￿nancial integration.
There are various economic channels through which a less developed ￿nancially open
country could ￿import￿ foreign productivity. First, international ￿nancial integration could
increase the productivity of less developed economies by allowing in￿ows of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in industries where foreign ￿rms enjoy a productivity advantage.34 The
33See Prasad, Rogoﬀ, Wei and Kose (2003) for a general discussion of the eﬀects of ￿nancial globalization
on developing countries.
34See Borenzstein, de Gregorio and Lee (1998) and Carkovic and Levine (2002) for evidence (and opposite
conclusions) on the impact of FDI on growth.
23entry of foreign capital could then increase the productivity of domestic labor both directly,
and indirectly by encouraging productivity gains in the domestic ￿rms that compete with the
new entrants or by technological spillovers from foreign to domestic ￿rms. One industry that
deserves special emphasis and separate consideration in this regard, is the banking sector. In
this case, the superior eﬃciency of foreign banks in allocating domestic saving could produce
eﬃciency gains in the whole economy (Levine (1996)). This channel comes with important
policy implications, since it would imply that the capital ￿ows that need to be preserved are
FDI, and not necessarily credit ￿ows.
There are also more indirect channels through which international ￿nancial integration
could aﬀect the policies and governance of less developed countries. Opening the capital
account could signal the quality of future policies (Bartolini and Drazen (1997)) or enhance
the domestic government￿s commitment to good policies (Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003)).
International ￿nancial integration induces countries to have good governance and a high
level of transparency in order to attract foreign investors ex ante, and to maintain these
good policies ex post in order to avoid a capital ￿ight. In that respect, a central dimension
of domestic policies is how respectful they are of private property rights￿whose key role in
development is widely acknowledged in economic and political science. There is a sense in
which capital account openness deepens and extends the property rights of private agents,
since it gives them the freedom to move their property abroad (Quinn (2000)). We present in
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) a model where capital mobility ensures the respect of property
rights, which is necessary for the development of an eﬃcient, modern formal sector. On the
other hand, the disruption induced by volatile capital ￿ows could also have deleterious eﬀects
on domestic institutions, policies, and growth.
Finally, a lot of research remains to be done to assess the empirical relevance of these
channels. While this can be done in many ways, the approach of this paper can be pursued at
the empirical level by looking closely at the countries that experienced a productivity miracle
in the postwar period. On the basis of our sample, we can identify eight countries that closed
more 30 percent of their productivity gap with the U.S. between 1960 and 1995.35 All these
countries had annual productivity growth in excess of three percent over this period. If the
channels above mentioned are relevant, one would expect that ￿nancial integration played
a ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nt h ep r o d u c t i v i t yp e r f o r m a n c eo fa tl e a s ts o m eo ft h e s ec o u n t r i e s .T h i s
remains a question for further research.
35The list includes Korea, Botswana, Barbados, Israel, Cyprus, Mauritius, Hong Kong and Singapore.
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27Appendix A
The model with human capital
This appendix presents the model with accumulation of human and physical capital.
A.1 Assumptions





t grows at a constant rate g∗.
2. Human capital-augmented labor satis￿es: Ht = eφ(Et)Lt.
3. The representative ￿rm in the economy acts competitively on factor markets. Assuming that











where Rt denotes the domestic gross real interest rate, wt the normalized wage per eﬃciency
unit of labor, and e k = k/A0.
4. The representative domestic agent is in￿nitely lived and has time separable preferences de-











/(1 − γ),a n du(c)=l n( c) when γ =1 .
5. Human capital accumulation depends upon the fraction of time devoted to education, st,
according to
Et+1 =( 1− δe)Et + θs t, (A.3)
where 0 <s≤ st ≤ ﬂ s<1. We adopt ﬂ s =0 .5 and s =0 .
6. Labor market clearing imposes Lt =( 1− st)Nt.
7. There are two ￿nancial assets: the domestic capital stock kt and a riskless foreign bond bt
that pays a constant gross world interest rate R∗, equal to the inverse of the growth-adjusted
discount factor: g∗γ/β.
8. Investment in domestic capital is implicitly disorted at rate τ, so that the private return to
domestic capital is (1 − τ)Rt. The implicit rents generated by the distortion, Zt ≡ τRtKt
are rebated in a lump-sum fashion to the representative agent.
9. The (normalized) ￿ow budget constraint of the household is
ng∗
‡
￿ kt+1 +￿ bt+1
·
= R∗￿ bt +( 1− τ)Rt￿ kt + wtht +￿ zt − ￿ ct. (A.4)
28A.2 Steady State
Under these assumptions, physical and human capital converge to steady state values that are
independent of the capital account regime, and satisfy36
s∗ =1 −
R∗
















δk + n.g∗ − 1
δk + R∗/(1 − τ) − 1
(A.6)
is the domestic autarky investment rate that would prevail in steady state for an economy with
capital wedge τ.
A.3 Financial autarky
Under ￿nancial autarky, the economy must accumulate capital domestically (￿ bt =0for all t ≥ 0).













s.t. ng∗ ￿ kt+1 =( 1 − τ)Rt ￿ kt + wtht +￿ zt − ￿ ct
Et+1 =( 1 − δe) Et + θs t (P)
ht =( 1 − st) eφ(Et)
s ≤ st ≤ ﬂ s ; kt ≥ 0




















− ln(A0)/(1 − nβ)
·
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that solves the consumer problem (P) given the domestic
real interest R and wage w; (2) factor prices that satisfy equation (A.1); (3) markets that clear.




















θ − ﬂ µt + µt,
where ﬂ µt,r e s p .µt are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraints with s ≤ st ≤ ﬂ s.
36We assume that 1− ﬂ s ≤
R∗
ng∗ +δs−1
θφ0(E∗) ≤ 1−s. Equations (A.5) are obtained as the steady state solution to
(A.7).
















φ0 (Et+1)(1− st+1)θ +1− δe
⁄
.
The ￿rst equation is the standard Euler equation for the intertemporal allocation of consump-
tion.
The second equation characterizes the optimal intertemporal allocation of education. To under-
stand the intuition behind this equilibrium condition, consider the following experiment. Suppose
that at time t the household decides to increase the fraction of time devoted to education by ∆st.
At time t+1, it adjusts education to revert to the optimal plan by time t+2. The increase in edu-
cation today reduces eﬃcient labor supply by eφ(Et)∆st. This implies a decline in current income of
wt eφ(Et)∆st and a marginal utility loss of ￿ c
−γ
t wt eφ(Et)∆st. This is the left hand side of the equilib-
rium condition. At time t +1 , educational attainment equals Et+1 + θ∆st. This increases eﬃcient
labor supply by eφ(Et+1) (1 − st+1)φ0 (Et+1)θ∆st. To revert to the optimal plan by t +2 , educa-
tion needs to be adjusted by −∆st (1 − δe). This increases current hours by eφ(Et+1) (1 − δe)∆st.
Adding these two terms, multiplying by the wage wt+1 and the marginal utility of wealth ￿ c
−γ
t+1 and
discounting back to today at rate ng∗/R∗, gives the marginal utility gain on the right hand side of
the equilibrium condition.
One can verify that the log-linearized dynamic system admits two eigenvalues outside the unit
circle and is saddle-point stable. Starting from ￿ k0 and E0 the economy evolves along the stable






￿ c∗,s ∗,￿ k∗,E∗
·
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. Figure 7 presents the optimal consumption and education rules





the welfare of the representative agent with initial capital ￿ k0 and human












Assume now that the economy integrates ￿nancially with the rest of the world at time 0. Assume
the economy is suﬃciently small so as not to in￿uence the world interest rate R∗.









and the ￿constant￿ domestic wage w =( 1− α)ω(τ)
α .
Equation (A.8) implies that capital ￿ows are determined by the ratio of physical to human
capital, not by the amount of capital relative to steady state.














30Since the world interest rate equals the growth-adjusted discount rate, consumption also jumps
to a constant level, consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint:














where χ(τ)=( 1− α(1 − τ))ω(τ)
α+τ (1 − δk)ω(τ). χ(τ)ht represents labor income net of trans-
fers.
This consumption level diﬀers from the steady state autarky consumption ￿ c∗. Subtracting ￿ c
from ￿ c∗, we obtain:
￿ c∗ − ￿ c =( R∗ − g∗n)
‡
















This expression has two terms. The ￿rst one obtains in a model with physical capital only. It
represents the ￿growth-adjusted￿ annuity value of foreign debt if the country were to borrow im-
mediately the amount k∗ − k0 to attain its steady state. Consumption is lower since the country
needs to roll-over foreign debt permanently. The second term re￿ects the eﬀect of the accumula-
tion path for human capital on domestic labor income χ(τ)ht. If human capital is increasing, the
country will borrow against higher future labor income. This second eﬀect tends also to depress
long run consumption.
Convergence in h is not instantaneous, since human capital can only be accumulated domesti-
cally. Even if the economy starts with the correct amount of physical capital ￿ k0 = ￿ k∗, consumption
can be lower than in the autarky steady state if initial human capital is also below steady state,
h0 <h ∗.


























is equivalent to solving the following problem








(1 − st) eφ(Et)
s.t. Et+1 =( 1− δe)Et + θst (Q)
s ≤ st ≤ ﬂ s
E0 given






W0 (Et+1)θ + µt − ﬂ µt






where ﬂ µt,r e s p .µt are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraints with s ≤ st ≤ ﬂ s.
31One can show that the optimal schooling policy is bang-bang and oscillates around the steady
state. The linearized system exhibits a negative root, so that the state variable Et ￿bounces￿ around
its steady state value E∗. This feature of the discrete time problem would go away in the continuous
time limit (in continuous time, a predetermined variable cannot ￿jump￿ over the steady state). We
directly use the solution to the continuous limit of the model that converges to the steady state in
￿nite time.




st =ﬂ sE t <E
st =( E∗ − (1 − δe)Et)/θ if E ≤ Et ≤ E
st = s E<E t
where ﬂ E =[ E∗ − θs]/(1 − δe) and E =[ E∗ − θﬂ s]/(1 − δe).38
A.5 Welfare Gains




as the percentage increase in consumption that brings the welfare of the representative agent under


























where e c denotes the -constant- consumption level under integration and {￿ ct}
∞
0 denotes the con-


































= e(1−βn)(Uint(￿ k0,E0)−Uaut(￿ k0,E0))/N0 − 1.




as the Hicksian compensating variation, that is, the percent-
age decrease in consumption that makes the agent in the integrated economy indiﬀerent between






µ(￿ k0,E0)+1. In general, the compensating variation is
smaller than the equivalent variation.
A.6 Marginal Welfare Gains
Assume that at time 0 the capital in￿ow authorized at t+1is increased by dκt+1 = ct+1dc/c.W i t h










38That E ≤ E∗ ≤ ﬂ Ederives from s ≤ s∗ ≤ ﬂ s.
32and the resulting equivalent variation satis￿es:
∞ X
t=0
βt ln(1 + µ)=dU0,
so that, for small variations:







Using the de￿nition of the permanent value of the interest rate ￿ R, equation (10) obtains.
A.7 Development Accounting

















δk + g∗.n − 1
/
sk (τus)




The ￿rst term on the right hand side re￿ects the steady state diﬀerences in capital-output ratio:




B.1 Constructing human capital stocks
We adopt a piecewise linear representation of the returns to schooling consistent with the empirical
evidence in Psacharopoulos (1994). The marginal return to education is set to 13.4% for the ￿rst
four years of education, to 10.1% for the next four, and to 6.8% subsequently.
The concept of human capital we use is the average educational attainment for people over age
25, i.e. the average number of years of schooling in the population older than 25. This is a stock
measure, as needed for the theory. To measure Et, we rely on the Barro and Lee (2001) updated
dataset (see also Jones (1997)). This dataset constructs educational attainment every ￿ve years
from 1960 to 2000 for a sample of 138 countries, according to the following perpetual inventory
method:




where Et represents educational attainment in year t, πj represents the educational attainment rate
for cell j ￿i.e. the fraction of a school-age cohort enrolled in education cell j￿a n duj represents
the duration of cell j, i.e. the number of years of education for that cell. δ25,t represents the
depreciation rate for educational attainment and is equal to the fraction of the population aged
3325-29 (see Barro and Lee (1993) for a derivation). Barro and Lee provide data on six educational
categories: incomplete primary, primary, incomplete secondary, secondary incomplete higher and
higher education.






We measure steady state enrollment rates π∗
j and durations u∗
j using the latest available data.
Because this data is not directly available from the Barro and Lee dataset, we use data from the
UNESCO World Education Report, 2000 that reports data on duration for primary, incomplete
secondary and secondary education as well as net enrollment rates for primary and secondary
education and gross enrollment rates for tertiary education for the year 1996 (or the latest available
year when 1996 is not available). We assume, as Barro and Lee, that incomplete cycles have a
duration equal to half the full cycle and that higher education lasts four years. Gross enrollment
ratios refer to the total enrollment in a given education group, regardless of age, divided by the
population of the age group which oﬃcially corresponds to that education cell. The net enrollment
ratio only includes enrollment for the age group corresponding to the oﬃcial school age of primary
education. De￿ning PRI,SEC and HIGH as the UNESCO enrollment rates, we obtain:
π∗
p = PRI− SEC
π∗
s = SEC − HIGH
π∗
h = HIGH.
We split the UNESCO enrollment rates into complete and incomplete cycles using the Barro
and Lee rates of completion for primary, secondary and higher education.
Lastly, we annualize the depreciation rate and enrollment rates as follow: De￿ne st the annual
investment in schooling that satis￿es:
Et+1 =( 1− δe)Et + θst
as in the model. Assuming that st is constant between t − 5 and t, it follows that










Identifying with (B.1), we obtain:































34B.2 Constructing steady state capital stocks
Using data from Heston et al. (2002) Mark 6.1, we measure the average investment share ￿ sk in
gross GDP from 1985 to 1995. We then assume that the observed average investment rate is a
good approximation to the investment rate that would obtain in steady state under autarky:
￿ sk = α.
δk + n.g∗ − 1
δk + R∗/(1 − τ) − 1
. (B.2)
This approach is similar to Mankiw et al. (1992) who assume constant saving rates in their
tests of unconditional and conditional convergence. Similarly, the literature on calibrated business
cycle models often interprets historical averages as equivalent to steady state values (see Mendoza
and Tesar (1998) for an application to tax reform).39























39It is important to emphasize that this assumption does not imply that countries are estimated to be
close to their steady state. As a famous counter example, consider the Solow model. It assumes a constant

















































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
capital ratio (k/k*) 1995
Equivalent Variation
Figure 1: International Financial Integration, benchmark case.
The thin solid line corresponds to the theoretical gains from international ￿nancial integration as a function















































































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8
relative productivity, 1960
Productivity Catch-Up
Figure 2: Relative Productivity Change, A0/Aus
0 for non-OECD economies, 1960 to 1995.
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Figure 3: Domestic Output, ￿nancial integration and productivity catch-up.Change in the PDV
of domestic output from ￿nancial integration and a 25% productivity catch-up with the United States under
autarky. Year is 1995.
37Figure 4: Sample Convergence Trajectories; Thick line: Autarky. Dashed line: Financial
Integration. k0 =0 .5k∗ and E0 =0 .6E∗. Calibrated to the US economy. S e ef o o t n o t e2 3f o r
parameter values.
38Figure 5: Relative Output Path; Solid black line: physical capital only; Dashed black line: model with
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Panel D: Productivity Gap
Figure 6: Development Accounting.Year is 1995.
40Figure 7: Optimal Consumption and Education rules for various Educational Attainment.
Calibrated to the US economy. See footnote 23 for parameter values.
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